If you’ve never been to the battlefield and have any interest at all, by all means GO.
Just to recap — the two armies ran into each other largely by accident on July 1, 1863 at the sleepy Pennsylvania crossroads of Gettysburg. Lee was able to bring his forces to bear more quickly, but the Union Army narrowly avoided a crushing defeat when Lee’s subordinate Ewell didn’t initiate the clinching final attack in the fading evening hours (see my alternative defense of Ewell below).
The next day, July 2, the armies were lined up against each other with Meade’s Union Army in the famous “fishook” configuration anchored on one end by Culp’s Hill and the other end at Little Round Top. Lee attacked both flanks during the day, and the federals once again barely avoided disaster when Joshua Chamberlain and his Maine troops held off a determined Confederate assault on LRT.
July 3, 1863, the famous third day — what was Lee thinking???
This is the only thing I’be been able to figure out about Lee ordering Picketts' Charge: a similar situation had happened a little over a year before then, during the Peninsula Campaign near Richmond where McClellan and his Union Army substantially outnumbered the Confederates. McClellan had carelessly split his army across the Chickahominy River. Lee, who had just taken over command for the wounded Joe Johnston, decided to attack the part of the Union Army north of the river that was arrayed around Gaines' Mill in a way not dissimilar -- on a smaller scale -- to what Lee faced at Gettysburg. The attack had bogged down and Lee's troops were taking heavy losses. Then Lee sent Hood's Texas Brigade on a suicidal charge -- Pickett-style -- against the center of the Union line. Lo and behold, though no surprise to any of us on this board, the Texans broke through and the battle turned into a rout of that part of the Union Army.
From then on for the next year, Lee went on his amazing hot streak against an array of Union generals, turning McClellan away from Richmond, defeating Pope at Second Manassas (Bull Run), barely avoiding destruction by McClellan at Antietam, and winning decisive victories over Burnside at Fredericksburg and against overwhelming odds against Hooker at Chancellorsville. (It’s amazing to me that all the brilliant military success is Lee is known for, occurred in less than one short year between June 26, 1862 and May 1863.) I believe Lee had begun to believe his troops could do no wrong and I don't have any proof, but I believe that when he thought back on that magnificent tide-turning charge of the Texans at Gaines' Mill, he thought his soldiers under Pickett could do it one more time at Gettysburg.
Lee knew his army and the Confederate cause were living on borrowed time and that they could never win a war of attrition against the North, thus he was almost always relentlessly attacking and he's been criticized for wasting his limited personnel that way. Grant knew exactly the same thing and unlike his predecessors he kept constant pressure on Lee, which is why his campaigns of attrition against Lee entailed horrific losses, but eventually ground down the Confederates into submission.
Just to recap — the two armies ran into each other largely by accident on July 1, 1863 at the sleepy Pennsylvania crossroads of Gettysburg. Lee was able to bring his forces to bear more quickly, but the Union Army narrowly avoided a crushing defeat when Lee’s subordinate Ewell didn’t initiate the clinching final attack in the fading evening hours (see my alternative defense of Ewell below).
The next day, July 2, the armies were lined up against each other with Meade’s Union Army in the famous “fishook” configuration anchored on one end by Culp’s Hill and the other end at Little Round Top. Lee attacked both flanks during the day, and the federals once again barely avoided disaster when Joshua Chamberlain and his Maine troops held off a determined Confederate assault on LRT.
July 3, 1863, the famous third day — what was Lee thinking???
This is the only thing I’be been able to figure out about Lee ordering Picketts' Charge: a similar situation had happened a little over a year before then, during the Peninsula Campaign near Richmond where McClellan and his Union Army substantially outnumbered the Confederates. McClellan had carelessly split his army across the Chickahominy River. Lee, who had just taken over command for the wounded Joe Johnston, decided to attack the part of the Union Army north of the river that was arrayed around Gaines' Mill in a way not dissimilar -- on a smaller scale -- to what Lee faced at Gettysburg. The attack had bogged down and Lee's troops were taking heavy losses. Then Lee sent Hood's Texas Brigade on a suicidal charge -- Pickett-style -- against the center of the Union line. Lo and behold, though no surprise to any of us on this board, the Texans broke through and the battle turned into a rout of that part of the Union Army.
From then on for the next year, Lee went on his amazing hot streak against an array of Union generals, turning McClellan away from Richmond, defeating Pope at Second Manassas (Bull Run), barely avoiding destruction by McClellan at Antietam, and winning decisive victories over Burnside at Fredericksburg and against overwhelming odds against Hooker at Chancellorsville. (It’s amazing to me that all the brilliant military success is Lee is known for, occurred in less than one short year between June 26, 1862 and May 1863.) I believe Lee had begun to believe his troops could do no wrong and I don't have any proof, but I believe that when he thought back on that magnificent tide-turning charge of the Texans at Gaines' Mill, he thought his soldiers under Pickett could do it one more time at Gettysburg.
Lee knew his army and the Confederate cause were living on borrowed time and that they could never win a war of attrition against the North, thus he was almost always relentlessly attacking and he's been criticized for wasting his limited personnel that way. Grant knew exactly the same thing and unlike his predecessors he kept constant pressure on Lee, which is why his campaigns of attrition against Lee entailed horrific losses, but eventually ground down the Confederates into submission.
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