https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/22/australia-military-strategy-regional-policy-china/
It is not only China’s military capabilities, which it has been building for decades, that have caused anxiety. Rather, it is their increasingly aggressive use that has caused a growing sense of alarm. In just the last few months, Beijing has asserted control over Hong Kong, intruded into Taiwan’s airspace, trained guns on the Philippine Navy, harassed Malaysian vessels, sunk a Vietnamese fishing ship, rammed a Japanese coast guard vessel, reignited a deadly border conflict with India, and conducted cyberattacks and economic coercion against Australia.
It was against this backdrop that Morrison took the stage late last month to argue that Australians cannot afford to ignore what is occurring around, and to, them.
Reinvesting in deterrence capabilities demands that the United States follow Australia’s lead by investing in new types of forces. For years, America and its allies have worried that China’s growing arsenal of long-range missiles threatens forward bases and surface ships. Yet, the United States has been too slow to embrace effective counters, particularly dispersed air and sea denial systems, which would complicate China’s ability to threaten U.S. and allied assets. Canberra has signaled its intent to neutralize Beijing’s emerging power projection systems by using its own area denial capabilities to “hold adversary forces and infrastructure at risk further from Australia.” That is why Australian plans call for “submarines, advanced long-range strike weapons, remotely piloted combat aircraft, sea-mining and offensive cyber capabilities.” Taken together, these acquisitions have the potential to constrict Beijing’s ability to project power by turning China’s strategy of anti-access and area denial on its head.
The U.S. military—particularly the Marine Corps—is pursuing similar capabilities. Australia’s strategic update should serve as additional impetus to prioritize these efforts and resource them appropriately. Moreover, the allies should work together to develop these systems and concepts of operations. After all, if Beijing wants to change the territorial status quo in East Asia, it must cross large bodies of water. Reliable air and sea denial capabilities could neutralize China’s power projection forces, but maximizing their effectiveness will require close allied coordination.
It is not only China’s military capabilities, which it has been building for decades, that have caused anxiety. Rather, it is their increasingly aggressive use that has caused a growing sense of alarm. In just the last few months, Beijing has asserted control over Hong Kong, intruded into Taiwan’s airspace, trained guns on the Philippine Navy, harassed Malaysian vessels, sunk a Vietnamese fishing ship, rammed a Japanese coast guard vessel, reignited a deadly border conflict with India, and conducted cyberattacks and economic coercion against Australia.
It was against this backdrop that Morrison took the stage late last month to argue that Australians cannot afford to ignore what is occurring around, and to, them.
Reinvesting in deterrence capabilities demands that the United States follow Australia’s lead by investing in new types of forces. For years, America and its allies have worried that China’s growing arsenal of long-range missiles threatens forward bases and surface ships. Yet, the United States has been too slow to embrace effective counters, particularly dispersed air and sea denial systems, which would complicate China’s ability to threaten U.S. and allied assets. Canberra has signaled its intent to neutralize Beijing’s emerging power projection systems by using its own area denial capabilities to “hold adversary forces and infrastructure at risk further from Australia.” That is why Australian plans call for “submarines, advanced long-range strike weapons, remotely piloted combat aircraft, sea-mining and offensive cyber capabilities.” Taken together, these acquisitions have the potential to constrict Beijing’s ability to project power by turning China’s strategy of anti-access and area denial on its head.
The U.S. military—particularly the Marine Corps—is pursuing similar capabilities. Australia’s strategic update should serve as additional impetus to prioritize these efforts and resource them appropriately. Moreover, the allies should work together to develop these systems and concepts of operations. After all, if Beijing wants to change the territorial status quo in East Asia, it must cross large bodies of water. Reliable air and sea denial capabilities could neutralize China’s power projection forces, but maximizing their effectiveness will require close allied coordination.
