I'd like to focus on this paragraph from today's Majority opinion:
"Finally, it must be emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to religious doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned. The First Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are given proper protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths, and to their own deep aspirations to continue the family structure they have long revered. The same is true of those who oppose same-sex marriage for other reasons. In turn, those who believe allowing same-sex marriage is proper or indeed essential, whether as a matter of religious conviction or secular belief, may engage those who disagree with their view in an open and searching debate. The Constitution, however, does not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex."
I've heard several in the media claiming that this paragraph offers protection to religious groups who were worried that they would be compelled to endorse marriages that to which they object. However, a close reading of the above paragraph indicates that the only protection offered is the protection for religious groups to "continue to advocate" that "same-sex marriage should not be condoned". They are free to "seek to teach the principles...that are central to their own deep aspirations to continue the family structure they have long revered." But this says nothing about what they must actually do. It specifies that the State cannot bar same-sex couples from marriage, but nowhere does it expressly declare that churches or religious groups are allowed to do so.
There does exist, of course, a religious exemption to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an exemption which allows religious organizations to discriminate on the basis of religion. In other words, a church can deny employment to an atheist janitor. But this exemption is subject to challenge: Churches may not discriminate on the basis of race, or gender. Should they be allowed to discriminate on the basis sexual preference, now that sexual preference has its seat at the table with race and gender? In the case of a gay couple seeking marriage in a church, will the Court regard the couples' gayness as grounds for legitimate religious objection or grounds for Constitutional protection?
After the last two days, is there really any doubt what the Court will do?
The language in the paragraph I cited is as flimsy a protection as could possibly be imagined. Seriously, the Court just said that "it must be emphasized" that religious people may continue to argue for their cause. The Court had to emphasize that freedom of speech continues to exist for religious people. But what the Court goes out of its way to pointlessly emphasize draws attention to the far more meaningful issue that it chose to remain silent about: which is that the Court acknowledges no definite protection for a religious organization's freedom of action with regard to its own religious practice.
Thus bad begins, and worse remains behind.
"Finally, it must be emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to religious doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned. The First Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are given proper protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths, and to their own deep aspirations to continue the family structure they have long revered. The same is true of those who oppose same-sex marriage for other reasons. In turn, those who believe allowing same-sex marriage is proper or indeed essential, whether as a matter of religious conviction or secular belief, may engage those who disagree with their view in an open and searching debate. The Constitution, however, does not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex."
I've heard several in the media claiming that this paragraph offers protection to religious groups who were worried that they would be compelled to endorse marriages that to which they object. However, a close reading of the above paragraph indicates that the only protection offered is the protection for religious groups to "continue to advocate" that "same-sex marriage should not be condoned". They are free to "seek to teach the principles...that are central to their own deep aspirations to continue the family structure they have long revered." But this says nothing about what they must actually do. It specifies that the State cannot bar same-sex couples from marriage, but nowhere does it expressly declare that churches or religious groups are allowed to do so.
There does exist, of course, a religious exemption to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an exemption which allows religious organizations to discriminate on the basis of religion. In other words, a church can deny employment to an atheist janitor. But this exemption is subject to challenge: Churches may not discriminate on the basis of race, or gender. Should they be allowed to discriminate on the basis sexual preference, now that sexual preference has its seat at the table with race and gender? In the case of a gay couple seeking marriage in a church, will the Court regard the couples' gayness as grounds for legitimate religious objection or grounds for Constitutional protection?
After the last two days, is there really any doubt what the Court will do?
The language in the paragraph I cited is as flimsy a protection as could possibly be imagined. Seriously, the Court just said that "it must be emphasized" that religious people may continue to argue for their cause. The Court had to emphasize that freedom of speech continues to exist for religious people. But what the Court goes out of its way to pointlessly emphasize draws attention to the far more meaningful issue that it chose to remain silent about: which is that the Court acknowledges no definite protection for a religious organization's freedom of action with regard to its own religious practice.
Thus bad begins, and worse remains behind.
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